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The Enigma of “Ahmad al‑Shar’a”; from Membership in al‑Qaeda and ISIS to Entry into the Halls of Power
In the history of modern political transformations, few figures can be found who have undergone a “metamorphosis” as rapidly as Ahmad Hussein al‑Shar’, known as Abu Muhammad al‑Jolani. His story is not merely the narrative of a field commander in the Syrian war; rather, it is a precise dissection of how non‑state actors adapt to global geopolitical shifts. In a world where the traditional hegemony of major powers (such as the United States) is eroding and power vacuums are being filled by regional and hybrid actors, Jolani’s trajectory from a “wanted terrorist” to a “political diplomat” constitutes a unique case study for understanding the principles of confronting change in the global order. Is the change of attire—from military fatigues to a Western suit—a symbol of an ideological transformation, or merely a tactic for survival in the new Middle East?
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Mohammad Jolani; an Identity Crisis or a Survival Strategy?
Ultimately, under U.S. pressure, Bashar al‑Assad fell through a series of military operations, and Syria—after a decade of devastating war—turned into a laboratory for testing the power of emerging actors. At the heart of this laboratory stands Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS), which took control of vast areas of northwestern Syria (Idlib). The central question is this: how did a leader who once founded al‑Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, over the course of ten years, come to be presented as the only reliable option for administering part of Syrian territory and as a bulwark against chaos?
This shift in approach is not accidental. It reflects a deep understanding of the changing global balance of power—where Western powers, due to internal challenges and the rise of rivals such as China and Russia, no longer have the capacity or the will for direct “nation‑building,” and instead prefer to pursue their objectives through “local powers,” even those with controversial backgrounds.
From Iraq’s Solitary Confinement Cells to the Emirate of Idlib
The trajectory of Ahmad al‑Shar’ has not been linear. To understand his current position, the turning points of his life must be examined as raw data:
2003–2011: Formation in the Shadow of the Iraq War
Ahmad al‑Shar’ was born in Daraa, but his military identity was shaped in Iraq. After joining al‑Qaeda in Iraq (under Abu Musab al‑Zarqawi), he experienced imprisonment in the U.S.-run Camp Bucca. American prisons in Iraq effectively became universities for networking among future extremist commanders. This period illustrates the failure of the United States’ hard‑power approach in countering ideology.
2012–2016: The Rise of Jabhat al‑Nusra and the Great Break
With the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, he returned to Syria on a mission from Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi (then leader of ISIS) and founded Jabhat al‑Nusra. The strategic turning point came in 2016, when he publicly severed ties with al‑Qaeda. This move was not a religious repentance, but a calculated political decision aimed at removing the pretext for bombardment by global and regional powers.
2017–Present: The State‑Building Project
The establishment of the “Salvation Government” in Idlib marked his final pivot. The focus shifted from “global jihad” to “local control and public services.” At this stage, Jolani ruthlessly eliminated rivals in order to monopolize power.
This pattern recalls the trajectory of the Taliban in Afghanistan—a group that, by recognizing U.S. fatigue and shifting global priorities, changed its strategy from pure guerrilla warfare to regional diplomacy (the Doha talks) and ultimately to governing the country. Both cases demonstrate the decline of the West’s ability to dictate its preferred political structures.
The United States and Jolani; from Placing a Bounty on His Head to Hosting Him at the White House
Placing a Bounty on Abu Muhammad al‑Jolani’s Head:
In November 2017, during Donald Trump’s first presidential term, the U.S. State Department—through its official Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program—publicly announced a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification, capture, or elimination of Muhammad al‑Jolani (Ahmad al‑Shar’). The official justification was his leadership of Jabhat al‑Nusra as al‑Qaeda’s formal affiliate in Syria. This decision was taken precisely at a time when Jolani was attempting to rebrand himself by changing the group’s name (Fath al‑Sham → Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham) and creating media distance from al‑Qaeda. Washington assessed these moves as tactical and insincere, and by maintaining the bounty, it reinforced the “al‑Qaeda red line.”
Official Hosting of Ahmad al‑Shar’ at the White House:
According to reports by reputable media outlets, during Trump’s second presidency, the appearance of “Ahmad al‑Shar’” (the same figure previously known as Abu Muhammad al‑Jolani) at the White House effectively became a symbolic image of a policy reversal. A man who had until recently been defined in official U.S. narratives under terrorism dossiers entered the decision‑making room as a negotiating party following changes on the Syrian ground and the normalization project in Damascus–Washington relations. Regardless of the substance of behind‑closed‑doors agreements, this hosting carried a precise media message: the redefinition of friend and foe based on geopolitical functionality (cooperation against the resistance axis, sanctions pathways, and engineering a new security order in the Levant)—a move shocking to the general public, yet “ruthless realism” to policymakers.
Jolani’s Advantage; Rebranding and High Capacity for Transformation!
The analysis of Ahmad al‑Shar’’s behavior based on field data reveals three major tactical shifts aligned with models of modern hybrid governance:
A) Visual and Diplomatic Rebranding
Images released of Jolani in recent years—wearing Western suits, visiting markets, inaugurating development projects—represent a deliberate effort to normalize his image. His interview with the American journalist Martin Smith on PBS Frontline was a clear attempt to send a message to governments: “I am not your enemy; I am the existing reality.”
B) Monopoly‑Based Political Economy
Economic data indicate that HTS (Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham) controls the main economic choke points of Idlib, particularly the Bab al‑Hawa crossing. Through taxation, control of fuel markets, and currency exchange, the group has created a quasi‑independent proto‑state. Approximate figures suggest that HTS generates several million dollars per month from crossings and taxes, which are reinvested into military infrastructure.
C) Suppression of Hardline Rivals
Contrary to common perceptions, in recent years HTS has engaged most intensely with ideologically similar hardline groups (such as Hurras al‑Din, affiliated with al‑Qaeda). This serves as a signal to the international community that Jolani can act as a “local police force” against transnational terrorism—a role that major powers are no longer willing to perform directly.
Syria After Jolani Came to Power
Developments in Syria up to 2026 show that the country’s crisis has moved from a “civil war” to a stage of de facto fragmentation, where central sovereignty has lost its effective function and the country has been divided among local actors, ethnic groups, and foreign forces. In this context, Druze‑inhabited areas in the south (especially Suwayda), relying on local armed structures and deep distrust of Damascus, have moved toward autonomy—a trend that, alongside Kurdish demands in the northeast, has intensified the risk of Syria’s territorial disintegration.
At the same time, security and intelligence interactions between the new ruling structure in Damascus and the United States—primarily aimed at containing opponents, controlling borders, and limiting Iranian influence—have taken shape. However, these forms of cooperation have neither led to the reconstruction of state institutions nor prevented internal instability. On the regional level, the vacuum of effective sovereignty has prompted Israel to expand both the scope and intensity of its airstrikes inside Syria—attacks that mainly target military infrastructure, weapons depots, and positions of Iran‑aligned forces, but in practice further weaken Syria’s territorial integrity and increase the human cost for civilians.
A synthesis of field data and international reports indicates that the combination of domestic security authoritarianism, external interventions, and unresolved identity cleavages has pushed Syria to a point where even a change in ruling actors—without rebuilding accountable institutions and achieving national consensus—merely alters the form of the crisis, not its substance.
Lessons from the Developments in Syria for the Global Order
The transformations in Syria over the past decade—especially the non‑linear trajectory of actors such as Ahmad al‑Shar’—demonstrate that the global order in transition no longer operates on the basis of classical legitimacy, fixed red lines, or simple binaries such as “terrorist/state.” Instead, it is redefined according to functionality, territorial control, and threat management. The Syrian experience has shown that major powers, particularly the United States, have stepped back from the role of “global policeman” and turned toward minimalist realism—where relative stability, containment of priority adversaries, and lower costs take precedence over democracy, human rights, or the rebuilding of the nation‑state.
Within such an order, armed local actors can move from the margins to the center of decision‑making through the localization of power, ideological flexibility, and selective engagement with external powers—without necessarily becoming effective or legitimate states. At the same time, the inability of international structures to prevent fragmentation, proxy wars, and cross‑border attacks (such as Israel’s repeated airstrikes on Syria) indicates that national sovereignty in the global order is less a principle than a negotiable variable.
The key lesson of Syria for the global order is that in the emerging multipolar world, survival and influence are achieved not through ideological alignment, but through a precise understanding of power balances, recognition of the shifting interests of major actors, and the capacity for rapid adaptation to the unwritten rules of power—an order in which ethics, law, and alliances are conditional on circumstances, not the other way around.
Ahmad al‑Shar’, once a symbol of terror, is today established as an undeniable reality in Middle Eastern geopolitics. This reality is a clear emblem of a declining era in which major powers, by leveraging their preferred local actors, rewrite the rules of the game in their own favor—and not necessarily in the interest of nations.
Examining the Dimensions of the Decline of the Liberal Global Order
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